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NOTES
BANK CREDIT CARDS AND THE RIGHT OF
SETOFF
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit card systems have existed in this country since the
turn of the century' but until 1950 were utilized only by retail
merchants and service organizations as a convenience for their
customers. 2 In that year the Diner's Club, Inc., became the first
independent company to issue general purpose credit cards, fol-
lowed in the late 1950's by The American Express Company and
the Hilton Credit Corporation (Carte Blanche Card).' The late
1950's also marked the entry of major banks into competition for
the credit card market with a third distinct type of credit card
system.' This article focuses upon bank credit cards and a charac-
1. Credit cards were preceded by credit coins, which were used primarily by depart-
ment stores in the early 1900's. These were small metal discs stamped with the merchant's
name and the customer's account number. See Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VAL. U.L. Rv. 218 (1967), reprinted in 85 BANK. L.J. 941
(1968) [hereinafter cited only to BANK. L.J.]; Comment, Implied Contract-Credit Coins
and Cards-Negotiability, 2 U. Prrr. L. REv. 117 (1936).
2. The first credit cards were issued by nation-wide oil companies about 1914. Local
department stores adopted the idea, and airlines and railroads later followed suit. Daven-
port, supra note 1, at 942.
3. Id. at 942-43; Comment, Bank Credit Cards-Contemporary Problems, 41 FORD.
L. REv. 373 (1972). Primarily used by businessmen, these three cards dominated the
independent credit card field until the entry of the major banks. They became known as
the "T & E cards" (travel and entertainment). Id. at 373 n.4.
The fundamental innovation of these independent credit cards was the introduction
of a third party into the system-a party engaged in extending credit without selling
merchandise. This third party would enlist a nation-wide system of merchants to make
credit sales to the cardholders, thus greatly increasing the flexibility of the cards and the
convenience to consumers. The third party enters two distinct contracts. First, there is a
contract with the cardholder, in which the third party agrees to extend credit to the
cardholder by paying for items obtained through use of the card, while the cardholder
agrees to repay these credit advances on specified items. Second, there is a contract with
each participating merchant, in which the merchant agrees to honor the credit card by
making sales and recording them on the proper forms, while the third party agrees to pay
the merchant for the items or services purchased. See generally Weistart, Consumer
Protection in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative Controls, 70 MICH. L. Rv.
1476, 1476-77 (1972).
4. Weistart, supra note 3, at 1477. The bank credit card system involves essentially
the same three-party structure as do the older independent systems. See note 3 supra.
Nevertheless, bank cards warrant recognition as a distinct class of credit system, both
1
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teristic peculiar to them: the potential for collecting a card-
holder's delinquent credit card debt by setting it off against a
savings or checking account maintained by the cardholder with
the issuing bank.
.Until recently setoff has not been among the credit card prac-
tices challenged by consumer protection advocates. Instead, their
efforts have been directed at securing corrective legislation in
such areas as waiver-of-defense clauses,' unsolicited mailings,6
and cardholders' liability for unauthorized use.' The interest in
setoff, however, is no longer dormant, for bills have been intro-
duced in both the Ninety-Second8 and Ninety-Third Congresses
that would virtually eliminate the practice. Critics of setoff are
particularly upset because the consumer is seldom aware that his
bank possesses the right until it has been exercised against him.'0
Moreover, collecting credit card debts by setting them off is ap-
parently not uncommon." The following statement by Professor
William F. Willier, Director of the National Consumer Law Cen-
ter at Boston College Law School, crystallizes the argument
against setoff:
In almost every jurisdiction, banks have long enjoyed the
right to unilaterally set-off their alleged claims of indebtedness
because of the unique nature of a banking institution as the third party and because bank
cards are oriented primarily toward consumers rather than businessmen. Thii consumer
orientation is manifested in many ways, including the relative ease of acquiring bank
cards, the number and type of organizations honoring them, and the emphasis on revolv-
ing or installment bases for payment. See generally Davenport, supra note 1, at 943.
Many bank credit card transactions actually involve four parties rather than three
because there is both an "issuing bank" dealing with the cardholder and a "depository
bank" dealing with the merchant. The mechanics of a bank card system and the clearance
arrangement among banks are described in detail in Davenport, supra note 1, at 950-61.
For the purposes of this article, the differences between the three-party and four-party
models are immaterial.
5. See note 35 infra.
6. Truth in Lending Act § 132, 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970); see Weistart, supra note 3,
at 1485-1508.
7. Truth in Lending Act § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970); see Weistart, supra note 3,
at 1508-43.
8. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
9. S. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
10. Hearings on S. 652 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1971) (state-
ment of Betty Furness). The Master Charge agreement examined by the authors describes
the issuing bank's right of setoff, but the BankAmericard agreement does not. See note
32 infra.
11, S. RP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973); Hearings on S. 652, supra note
10, at 236 passim.
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RIGHT OF SETOFF
against deposit accounts. Reported appellate decisions reveal
that the practice originally arose and has been continued in the
context of business transactions. The advent of the bank credit
card, however, has occasioned extensive use of the set-off
against consumers.
The Center has received numerous complaints of this prac-
tice from lawyers throughout the country. In every instance, the
account being set-off against consisted of the family checking
account which represented the wages of the head of the family
and was being relied upon for the procurement of necessary
goods and services.
• . .[B]anks have apparently attempted to recoup losses
occasioned by their reckless and improvident merchandising by
appropriating the checking accounts of unwary consumers, ex-
tending them no opportunity to defend themselves of [sic]
work out an alternative system for payment.
12
Despite the numerous complaints received by the National
Consumer Law Center, only a few cases challenging credit card
setoff have been filed,1 3 and to date no judicial decisions have
been reported. Consumer concern about setoff may become acute,
however, because the incidence of setoff is likely to increase as
outstanding cards proliferate. Currently more than one of every
six American families uses a bank card regularly," and many of
these families are by no means affluent.15 Notwithstanding this
12. Hearings on S. 652, supra note 10, at 236-37.
13. Jojola v. Wells Fargo Bank, Civil No. C-71,900 (N.D. Cal., filed May 12, 1971);
Gleason v. Newton-Walton Bank & Trust Co., Civil No. 70-1291M (D. Mass. 1970).
The latter suit was filed and then dismissed after the parties agreed to settle. Telephone
interview with John H. Higgs, attorney for plaintiff, of N.Y. City, Nov. 3, 1972.
14. A study by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan esti-
mated that of the 70 million families in the United States 12 million now use bank credit
cards-or approximately one-sixth of all families. S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1973). This estimate is conservative in comparison with a statement by the National
Commission on Consumer Finance indicating that the two leading bank credit card sys-
tems alone serve an estimated 62 million consumers, which surely represents more than
12 million families. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 204 (Proof Copy, Dec. 1972) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER FIN. REP.].
15. A characteristic of bank credit cards is that their use is not restricted to those
who have secure sources of income and the financial stability to pay their credit card bills
even when unexpected expenses occur. For example, a survey by the American Bankers
Association is reported to have made the following findings: "Some 3,033 households were
surveyed in a sample survey. Of these, 913 had bank credit cards, or just under 1 in 3.
Only about 47% of the cardholders had some college education, and about 20% had never
graduated from high school. Analyzed by income level, about 42% had incomes of under
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popularity, banks continue to sustain heavy losses from credit
card operations,'" and it is therefore reasonable to assume that
they will resort to setoff with greater frequency. These conditions
will no doubt awaken the zeal of consumer protection advocates,
especially as some of the higher priority consumer issues are re-
solved.
In short, unless remedial legislation intervenes, the legality
of setting off credit card debts will soon be tested in the courts.
The purpose of this article is to examine the cogency of three
arguments that might bring about the judicial limitation of se-
toff: (1) that the mechanics of credit card setoff do not conform
to those required by common law doctrine; (2) that setoff violates
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; and (3) that
setoff is subject to regulation under existing consumer protection
statutes. In addition, a proposed legislative response to the ques-
tion of credit card setoff is evaluated.
II. COMMON LAW REQUISITES FOR SETOFF
By setting off cardholders' debts against their deposit ac-
counts, the banking community is simply seeking to bring a mod-
ern fact situation within the traditional rule that a bank may
apply a customer's deposits to satisfy a matured debt owed by
him to the bank.'7 Setoff is a right based on equitable principles
arising from the debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and
its depositor.' 8 Unless the parties' contract provides otherwise,' 9
a bank may set off against a customer's account without initiat-
16. Total losses were at least $115 million in 1970, more than 50% higher than in 1969,
according to Federal Reserve Board statistics. Hearings on S. 652, supra note 10, at 167
(statement of Walter D. Malcolm). This figure represented some 1.8% of the systems'
year.end outstandings. CONSUMER FIN. REP., supra note 14, at 204. The assumption is that
banks continue to accept these heavy losses because they envision bank credit cards as
the forerunner of an "electronic funds transfer system," with the credit card losses being
essentially research and development costs. Id. Perhaps banks also use a credit card
system as a "loss leader," that is, a promotional device to attract customers who will
utilize the banks' more remunerative services.
17. United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U.S. 387, 395 (1925) (dicta);
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Scott Bros. Constr. Co., 461 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1972); Holloway
v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Idaho 746, 265 P. 699 (1928); Goeman v. Live Stock Nat'l Bank,
238 Iowa 1088, 29 N.W.2d 528 (1947); Kasparek v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 39
P.2d 127 (1934).
18. See Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 173 N.C. 180, 91 S.E. 793 (1917);
Jeter v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 419 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
19. E.g., Mohan v. Woburn Nat'l Bank, 313 Mass. 306, 47 N.E.2d 289 (1943); Livings-
tain v. Columbian Banking & Trust Co., 77 S.C. 305, 57 S.E. 182 (1907). When a customer
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ing a judicial proceeding,"0 giving notice to the customer,2' or
securing his consent.22 The utility of such an unrestricted power
is readily apparent for, with a simple bookkeeping operation,
deposits funds in a general deposit account, title to the funds passes to the bank which
then becomes indebted to its customer for the amount deposited. 5A A. MICHIE, BANKS
AND BANKING § 1 (1950) [hereinafter cited as MICHIE].
20. Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 105 P.2d
118 (1940).
21. Delano v. Equitable Trust Co., 110 Misc. 704, 181 N.Y.S. 852 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
In 5A MICHIE § 115d, the following statement is made: "In South Carolina a bank
cannot apply a depositor's balance to the payment of his indebtedness to it without his
consent or previous notice to him." Although this assertion is marginally supported by
the two cases cited as authority, and there has been no direct holding to the contrary by
the South Carolina Supreme Court, it is extremely doubtful that this is a correct state-
ment of the law in South Carolina today.
The first cited case is Simmons Hardware Co. v. Bank of Greenwood, 41 S.C. 177, 19
S.E. 502 (1894). The corporate depositor had maintained two separate accounts and had
treated them consistently as segregated accounts for some time; one of them frequently
showed a deficit because of the company's financial arrangement with the bank. The court
ruled that the bank could not claim a setoff from the other account on the occasion in
question. The decision appears to be based upon alternative holdings: (1) There was an
implied contract that the two accounts would be kept separate in their application, so that
the bank could not set them off without the consent of the company (see note 22 and
accompanying text infra); (2) the long-standing custom between the parties estopped the
bank from changing its practice without notice to the company. This is probably the
language upon which MIMHE relied, but it clearly does not support the broad statement
made therein.
The second cited case is Callahan v. Bank of Anderson, 69 S.C. 374, 48 S.E. 293
(1904). In Callahan the controlling opinion definitely held that bank setoff could not take
place without either notice or consent. (It is not clear exactly which would be required.)
The opinion treats Simmons Hardware as mandatory authority, perhaps because counsel
for the bank gave notice that he wished to argue for its reversal. The court was split 2-2
on the case, however, with the result that the lower court decision was allowed to
stand-hardly a persuasive precedent. The dissent, demonstrating that Simmons
Hardware was not in point, is the more impressive opinion.
Shortly thereafter, the court was faced with a fact situation very similar to Simmons
Hardware in Hiller v. Bank of Columbia, 92 S.C. 445, 75 S.E. 789 (1912). Although
following Simmons Hardware and citing Callahan, the court, "[tlo avoid misunderstand-
ing," made the following statement: "[T]he right of the depositor to demand his bal-
ance is subject to the right of the bank to set off against the balance any debt due by him
to the bank .... " Id. at 448, 75 S.E. at 790. No mention was made of a requirement of
notice or consent, and in the context of remanding for a new trial the court obviously
intended to state the applicable law for guidance.
In a dictum three years later, the court clearly assumed that Hiller had brought the
law in South Carolina into accord with the general rule: "And, as there was no agreement,
express or implied, forbidding it. . . .the bank had the right to set off its debt to Wilkins
for the amount of the deposit against Wilkins' debt to the bank." Southern Trust Co. v.
Wilkins, 101 S.C. 457, 459, 86 S.E. 26, 27 (1915) (emphasis added).
There are no subsequent cases in which the issue is clearly raised, but neither is there
any indication that the Callahan rule has survived.
22. Gonzalez & Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ariz. 308, 25 P.2d 552 (1933); Knapp v. Cowell,
77 Iowa 528, 42 N.W. 434 (1889).
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banks can collect debts peremptorily, provided they are willing
to antagonize customers in order to do so.
Since the right of setoff was recognized long before bank
credit cards came into existence, 23 it obviously cannot be con-
tended that the setoff doctrine as originally formulated was
intended to encompass bank credit card debts. These debts, how-
ever, appear to comply with the criteria established by the courts
when upholding setoff in more conventional circumstances:
2 (1)
mutuality of obligation,s (2) maturity of the depositor's obliga-
tion,"0 and (3) certainty of the amount of the debt.
2
1
Mutuality of obligation means essentially that the customer
must be acting in the same capacity in his dual roles of depositor
and debtor.2 The mutuality concept can be made clearer by ex-
ample than by further definition. A bank may not set off a part-
nership debt against the individual account of one partner, even
though it might have a cause of action against the partner for the
partnership debt; 9 nor may a bank set off against a joint account
in the names of A and B a debt due from A individually.30 These
and other limitations 3' imposed by the mutuality requirement
should apply in the particular case where the debt results from
the use of a bank credit card, but they have no special effect on
credit card setoff in general. In the most common situation an
individual consumer maintains both a credit card and a deposit
23. Compare the dates of the cases in note 17 supra with the text accompanying note
4 supra.
24. Setting off against a depositor's account when these criteria have not been met
may subject the bank to tort liability for conversion. See, e.g., James Mills Orchard Co.
v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 137 Cal. App. 299, 30 P.2d 626 (1934); Black
v. Whitewater Commercial & Say. Bank, 188 Wis. 24, 205 N.W. 404 (1925).
25. John Wills, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 125 N.J.L. 546, 16 A.2d 804 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1940); 5A MIcHIE § 115c.
26. Gillett v. Williamsville State Bank, 310 11. App. 395, 34 N.E.2d 552 (1941); 5A
MICHIE § 115b.
27. Tallapoosa County Bank v. Wynn, 173 Ala. 272, 55 So. 1011 (1911); 5A MICHm
§ 119a.
28. "iThe debts [must] be due to and from the same persons in the same capac-
ity." Holloway v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Idaho 746, 751, 265 P. 699, 700 (1928).
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Capps, 208 Ala. 207, 94 So. 109 (1922); Adams v. First Nat'l
Bank, 113 N.C. 332, 18 S.E. 513 (1893). Contra, Owsley v. Bank of Cumberland, 23 Ky.
L. Rptr. 1726, 66 S.W. 33 (Ct. App. 1902).
30. Peoples Bank v. Turner, 169 Md. 430, 182 A. 314 (1936). Although this result
should follow from simple considerations of mutuality, there are so many exceptions and
contrary holdings on particular facts that it cannot be called an accepted rule. See
generally Annot., 118 A.L.R. 386 (1939); Annot., 103 A.L.R. 493 (1936).
31. See 5A MICHIE §§ 115c, 118c, 128-44.
[Vol. 26
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account in his own name and for his own personal use, and mu-
tuality of obligation clearly exists.
Similarly, the requirement that the depositor's debt must
have matured is not an obstacle to credit card setoff. The problem
of when maturity of the debt occurs is resolved by the credit
agreement, which allows the cardholder twenty-five days from
the billing date to make payment. The cardholder may either pay
in full and thereby avoid a finance charge, or pay in part, subject
to a specified minimum, and incur a finance charge on the bal-
ance. If he fails to make this minimum payment on time, the
agreement permits the bank to accelerate the debt and declare
all amounts due and payable. 2 At this time the cardholder's debt
is mature for purposes of the setoff doctrine.
The requirement that the bank's claim be "certain, definite,
and liquidated, or capable of liquidation by calculation without
the intervention of a jury to estimate the sum" '3 is potentially
more troublesome. By nature a debt resulting from the use of a
credit card is neither as definite nor as incontrovertible as a note
given to the bank-the transaction that originally spawned the
setoff doctrine. The cardholder may dispute some mechanical
aspect of the billing process: He may have been billed for a pur-
chase on another card, billed an incorrect amount, or billed twice
for the same purchase. The certainty of the debt may also be
undermined when the cardholder, after discovering that the mer-
chandise he obtained is defective, decides to withhold payment
until the defect is satisfactorily remedied.
Banks attempt to avoid both of these potential uncertainties
by a careful drafting of their cardholder agreements. With regard
to mechanical billing disputes, they allow a specified period of
32. The following statement is taken from a copy of the Master Charge credit agree-
ment received with a Master Charge card:
Notwithstanding anything herein, in the event of (a) default by Cardholder in
making any payment when due and payable, . . .then, at Bank's option, all
amounts due from Cardholder to Bank shall become immediately due and paya-
ble, and any and all amounts due from Bank to Cardholder, including amounts
on deposit with Bank, may be off-set and applied in satisfaction of Cardholder's
indebtedness . . . . In any such event Cardholder agrees to pay all costs of
collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Bank.
Master Charge Rules and Regulations and Cardholder Agreement 14 (no date indi-
cated) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Master Charge Agree.]. The BankAmeri-
card agreement contains an analogous term but does not specifically mention the right of
setoff. BankAmericard Retail Installment Credit Agreement 9 (Feb. 27, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as BankAmericard Agree.].
33. 5A MICHIE § 119a.
1974]
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time for a cardholder to examine his statement and notify the
bank of any discrepancies or charges believed to be in error; the
period generally allowed is fifteen days.-" According to the card-
holder agreements, a statement is deemed to be admitted if not
challenged during the specified period. To preclude the possibil-
ity of a cardholder's withholding payment for defective merchan-
dise or service, credit card, agreements contain a "waiver-of-
defense clause ' 3 that insulates the issuing bank from warranty
and similar defenses. Such a clause requires that the cardholder
pay the bank in full and independently seek restitution or satis-
factory performance from the merchant. If these two clauses are
given effect as written, they render credit card debts certain
within the meaning of common law setoff requirements.
The question in a given case thus becomes whether these
clauses will be enforced by the courts. If they appeared in a con-
tract resulting from true negotiation between parties of equal
bargaining strength, such clauses would undoubtedly be upheld.
Cardholder agreements, however, are non-negotiated "take -it-or-
leave-it" contracts, and the clauses in question typically appear
amidst boiler plate language which discourages scrutiny. Thus,
courts might decline to give effect to such one-sided contract
provisions on the grounds that enforcement would violate public
policy or lead to an unconscionable result.
36
34. The Master Charge agreement examined by the authors provides for a fifteen day
period from the billing date, while the BankAmericard agreement allows fifteen days from
receipt by the cardholder. Compare Master Charge Agree. 12 with BankAmericard
Agree. 2(c).
35. The BankAmericard agreement examined by the authors includes the following
provision:
Issuer shall have no responsibility for any claim or cause of action arising out
of, or in any way related to a Card Purchase which Buyer may have against any
seller, including the refusal of any seller to honor the Card; Buyer agrees that
his liability to Issuer for Card indebtedness is absolute and that Buyer will settle
or redress any disputes directly with the seller.
BankAmericard Agree. 4.
36. The concept of a contract provision being unconscionable or a violation of public
policy is not capable of objective definition. Perhaps th most famous case on this issue
is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which involved
a disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of an automobile. The
court devoted many pages to this issue, mentioning the unequal bargaining power of the
parties, the fact that all automobile manufacturers offered the same warranty terms, the
fact that the clause undermined otherwise applicable law without any corresponding
benefit to the consumer, the fine print in the contract, the failure to call attention to the
clause and its meaning, the likelihood that the average consumer would not understand
the clause, and the basic unfairness of its application. Id. at 385-404, 161 A.2d at 84-95.
[Vol. 26
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For several reasons, the clause providing that the statement
will be deemed correct after a stated period of time appears par-
ticularly vulnerable to challenges on these grounds. This time
limitation is wholly self-serving on the part of the bank. In many
cases it would allow the bank to profit from its own mistake
without showing any harm occasioned by the cardholder's delay.
Moreover, the fixed and inflexible time period conflicts with both
the common law37 and the Uniform Commercial Code,38 which
permit a customer a reasonable time under the circumstances
within which to examine his checking account statement. The
fifteen-day period typically allowed39 might be challenged as too
short, especially when compared with the twenty-five days al-
lowed for payment. And, most fundamentally, the conclusive pre-
sumption of correctness conflicts directly with the common law
rule governing checking accounts under which a customer's fail-
ure to notify the bank of errors in his statement creates only a
presumption of correctness that can be overcome by specific evi-
dence introduced during the course of the proceeding." These
factors suggest that time-limitation clauses may well be unen-
forceable.
It is not possible to isolate any subset of these factors as determinative of the clause's
ultimate invalidity. The technique with regard to an issue of this sort is to examine the
overall factual picture and draw a rather subjective final conclusion as to whether the
clause will be enforced.
The Uniform Commercial Code adopts this approach in its article on sales by giving
a court wide latitude in tailoring enforcement of a contract if "as a matter of law [it]
finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made. . . ." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1). The only specific guide in the
section itself is that the court is to hear evidence from both sides on the clause's "commer-
cial setting, purpose and effect." The Code nowhere defines unconscionability and, in-
deed, provides a circular test for unconscionability in which the key operative word is
"unconsionable." Id., Comment 1.
37. Forbes v. First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. Super. 17, 95 A.2d 416
(1953); Weck v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 202 Pa. Super. 39, 195 A.2d 111 (1963).
See 5B MICHIE § 308.
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406(1) states that a customer must exercise "rea-
sonable care and promptness" in examining his statement and notifying the bank of
unauthorized signatures or altered checks.
39. See note 34 supra.
40. Monier v. Guaranty Trust Co., 82 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670
(1936); Shipman v. Bank of State, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891). See 5B MICHIE § 308.
These clauses in bank credit card agreements could probably be interpreted by the
courts to have only this limited result because their language is not precise. For example,
the BankAmericard agreement examined by the authors provides only that the statement
"shall be deemed admitted." See Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing
Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937) (clause limiting time for complaints held inapplic-
able to latent defect which could not reasonably have been discovered within that time).
9
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Waiver-of-defense clauses have been strongly attacked be-
cause they deprive purchasers of consumer goods and services of
their one truly effective element of leverage-the right to with-
hold payment until they receive satisfactory performance.4' This
criticism is reflected by a proposed amendment to the Truth in
Lending Act 2 that would severely limit a bank's ability to require
payment by immunizing itself against claims or defenses result-
ing from disputed consumer transactions.13 The contention that
these challenges are serious enough to warrant invalidating
waiver-of-defense clauses as contrary to public policy is premised
41. S. REP. No. 93-278, supra note 11, at 9-11; Hearings on S. 652, supra note 10, at
235 (statement of William F. Willier, Director, National Consumer Law Center); id. at
261-62 (statement of Fairfax Leary, Jr., Public Interest Research Group); id. at 283-85
(statement of Prof. John A. Spanogle); Comment, Bank Credit Cards-Contemporary
Problems, 41 FORD. L. REv. 373 (1972); Note, Preserving Consumer Defenses In Credit
Card Transactions, 81 YALE L.J. 287 (1971); see CONSUMER FIN. REP., supra note 14, at
34-38.
A synopsis of the consumer arguments presented is as follows: Fraudulent merchants
use their bank credit card recognition as a badge of prestige and a sign of bank approval.
If banks are insulated from responsibility and loss, they will be lax in selecting merchants
to participate under their plans. Banks can eliminate many consumer complaints by
screening participating merchants more carefully. Banks can also exert leverage on partic-
ipating merchants by influencing them to respond to consumer complaints. Typically,
there are clauses in the agreements with participating merchants allowing banks to charge
back to the merchants any sales in which the merchant has not properly carried out his
obligations to the consumer. The consumer generally has no other satisfactory remedy,
since the cost of litigation usually exceeds the amount in dispute. The banks, however,
can spread the costs of recovery and of unrecoverable losses over all the card users.
The banks' rejoinder to this argument might be as follows: A bank is simply not
equipped to police merchants to any significant degree. The extra costs of attempting to
screen and police merchants, plus the unrecoverable losses, could not be spread by a bank
because state laws regulate finance charges. The bank credit card issuer-holder relation-
ship is in reality a direct loan to the consumer, and the bank should not be responsible
for use of the money. If the unpaid debt is shifted back to the merchant, he is in no better
position than the consumer would be to counter unfounded claims-especially if the
amount in question is relatively small, the consumer resides a great distance away, and
the merchant extended credit to him solely on the basis of his possession of a bank card.
See Hearings on S. 652, supra note 10, at 353-60 (Joint Bankers Association statement);
Note, supra, 81 YALE L.J. 287.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970).
43. S. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 170 (1973). This bill contains detailed exceptions
but basically would subject the bank to all non-tort claims and all defenses that the
merchant would normally face, unless the transaction does not exceed fifty dollars or the
cardholder lives in another state and more than 100 miles from the location of the transac-
tion. These exceptions are a concession to the banks' position in an apparent attempt to
aid passage of the bill. A comparable bill in the Ninety-Second Congress would have
subjected banks to "all claims and defenses," S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 169 (1971),
but it died in the House Banking and Currency Committee. S. REP. No. 93-278, supra note
11, at 29.
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upon cases in which similar clauses were not enforced when in-
voked by assignees of consumer installment sales contracts." One
major distinction in credit card cases is that, instead of being an
assignee closely associated with the seller and tainted by his
wrongdoing,4" a bank is a relatively independent third party
whose function as the issuer of a credit card is technically that of
a lender." In addition, while in an installment sales situation a
consumer has neither control over the assignment of his contract
nor knowledge of who the assignee will be, a credit card purchaser
is fully aware that his obligation is payable to the bank. Although
these differences may prevent the bank credit card waiver-of-
defense clauses from being labeled unconscionable or contrary to
public policy, it is clear that a strong argument can be advanced
for holding them invalid.
If either of these arguments were successfully presented in a
given case, the credit card debt would no longer have the element
of certainty required by the common law setoff doctrine, and any
setoff which had been exercised by the bank would be invalid. It
does not necessarily follow, however, that banks would be pre-
cluded from future use of setoff against credit card debts. Pre-
sumably, arbitrary time periods or absolute waiver-of-defense
clauses would have to be deleted from credit card agreements, but
the necessary level of certainty might still be attained simply by
allowing the cardholder a reasonable period of time in which to
inform the bank of any disputes.47 The requirement that the debt
be certain is a subjective test designed to measure a bank's actual
knowledge, thus preventing the bank from settling known dis-
putes by an exercise of its setoff power; a bank could never be
absolutely certain that its customer did not have some possible
defense requiring jury intervention. In the traditional application
of setoff, the general utility of the practice has not been impaired
44. Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); Unico v.
Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 518 (1971). For a succinct
discussion of the "close connectedness" doctrine evolving from these decisions as the
rationale for stripping "interested" purchasers of chattel paper of their holder in due
course status, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-8, at 479-84
(1972).
45. See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
46. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(9); id. § 3.106, Comment.
On the other hand, it might be claimed that the bank's selection of the merchant for
plan participation and its appearance of approval of the merchant's business practices
sufficiently connect the bank to the merchant's wrongdoing.
47. See notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text supra.
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by the fact that there have been individual cases in which its use
was forbidden. Although arguments that credit card debts are
uncertain may be successful, especially if waiver-of-defense
clauses are legislatively or judicially forbidden, these arguments
do not undermine the entire practice of bank credit card setoff.
One further point may be made regarding the common law
setoff requirements. It is clear that the traditional guidelines were
propounded at a time long before the question of bank credit card
setoff could possibly have arisen. 8 A court might therefore be
receptive to the argument that, because a bank credit card sys-
tem is a new and distinctive bank operation, traditional setoff
guidelines should not be conclusive. In other words, the court
might evaluate the desirability of banking setoff on its own merits
free from binding precedent. The common law validity of bank
credit card setoff may thus remain open to at least some doubt.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
Setoff by a bank against a customer's deposit account is
usually a summary proceeding since there is no requirement that
the customer receive notice or a prior hearing on the merits of the
bank's claim." Any such proceeding must be considered suspect
today in light of a succession of recent Supreme Court decisions
striking down summary actions for violating the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment." If banks continue to use
their setoff power, they will undoubtedly be called upon to justify
it in terms of the constitutional principles underlying these deci-
sions.,',
The cases most analogous to the question of banking setoff
are Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.5 and Fuentes v. Shevin,53
48. See note 23 supra.
49. This is true regardless of whether the customer's debt to the bank has arisen
I hrough use of a hank credit card or otherwise, and this discussion of constitutional issues
thus applies to any summary banking setoff.
50. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Wisconsin's prejudgment
wage garnishment procedure); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (New York City's
termination of welfare payments); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (Georgia's
suspension of drivers' licenses on a "fault" basis); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(Florida's and Pennsylvania's replevin processes).
51. One commentator, writing before Fuentes was decided, concluded that summary
banking setoff is constitutionally invalid. Note, Banking Setoff: A Study in Commercial
Obsolescence, 23 HASTINGs L. REV. 1585, 1602-10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hastings
Notel.
52. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
153. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
[Vol. 26
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both of which involved summary action in commercial contexts
for the benefit of private parties. Fuentes is undoubtedly the
leading authority because of its more detailed opinion, its more
recent date, and its elaboration of the Sniadach holding. 4 The
lower courts have already interpreted Fuentes to require notice
and an opportunity for a prior hearing in a number of established
commercial proceedings. Among the summary practices which
have been held to be violative of due process for failure to comply
with these requirements are replevin, 5 prejudgment attachment
of property,56 prejudgment garnishment of bank accounts,57 a
landlord's lien or right of distraint,5 and a garageman's lien."9
From the viewpoint of the individual against whom these prac-
tices are used, the key factor is that he is precluded from present-
ing his side of the story prior to a deprivation of the use of his
"property." In this respect the practices are similar in nature to
banking setoff. Although this analogy is attractive at first glance,
it should not be allowed to detract from the true legal issue in-
volved: Does summary banking setoff violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment?
According to the relevant language of the fourteenth amend-
ment, no state shall deprive any person of property without due
process of law. Assuming that Fuentes has established the mini-
mum standards for due process in the commercial context, the
problem becomes whether in a given case there has been a depri-
vation of a property interest which does not comply with these
standards. If so, the remaining question is whether there was
54. Id. at 88-89.
55. Turner v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972); Mitchell v. Tennessee,
:351 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa
1972).
56. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 42
U.S.L.W. 2132 (D. Mass., Aug. 7, 1973); Lake Arrowhead Estates, Inc. v. Cumming, 42
U.S.L.W. 2035 (D. Me., June 25, 1973); McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1013 (D.R.I. 1972); Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alas. 1972).
57. Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1973); Schneider v. Mar-
gossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972); Brunswick Corp. v. Galaxy Cocktail Lounge,
Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 2175 (Hawaii, Sept. 7, 1973).
58. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Fla. 1972); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert,
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va.
1972); Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty
Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 2072 (N.Y., July 13, 1973).
59. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 2062 (2d Cir., June 29,
197:3); Mason v. Garris, 42 U.S.L.W. 2005 (N.D. Ga., June 21, 1973); Straley v. Gassaway
Motor Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 2006 (S.D.W. Vi., June 6, 1973).
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sufficient state involvement in the deprivation to bring it within
the prohibitions of the amendment.
There can be no serious doubt that removing funds from a
customer's deposit account deprives him of "property" within the
meaning of the due process clause. While a customer does not
retain title to the funds he deposits in a bank, he does become a
creditor to whom the bank owes a debt;"0 this debt is as much a
property interest as the unpaid wages earned by the employee in
Sniadach. Banking setoff operates to deprive the depositor of this
intangible property interest just as the garnishment in Sniadach
deprived the employee of hers. Although Fuentes involved chat-
tels in the possession of the individuals, the Court was careful to
point out that the requirement of "[property] has been read
broadly to extend protection to 'any significant property inter-
est.' , Furthermore, the lower courts which have relied on
Fuentes in dealing with prejudgment garnishment of bank ac-
counts have not even felt it necessary to comment on the question
of whether a bank account constitutes "property" within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment."
The difficulty arises in consideration of the other requisite to
invoking the due process clause: state action. The Supreme Court
has not yet reached the question of the state action requirement
in the area of summary commercial practices; this was not at
issue in either Fuentes or Sniadach, where the state action was
clear and unquestioned. 3 The lower courts, however, have faced
the state action issue, and the results have been far from unani-
mous. For example, the question has been frequently raised in the
area of self-help repossession by a secured party pursuant to sec-
tion 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 4 The issue
60. See cases cited note 18 supra.
61. 407 U.S. at 86.
62. See cases cited note 57 supra.
63. In Fuentes the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes authorized state agents
to make the actual seizure of possessions. 407 U.S. at 73-78. In Sniadach the garnishee
summons was issued by the clerk of court. 395 U.S. at 338-39.
The Court in Fuentes did touch on the question of state action in a footnote: 'The
creditor could, of course, proceed without the use of state power, through self-help, by
'dist raining' the property before a judgment." 407 U.S. at 79 n.12. This statement is
located in a discussion of the historical development of replevin, however, and probably
was not intended to have other than historical significance.
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE § 9-503 provides in part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take posses-
sion of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
[Vol. 26
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is whether the mere enactment of this section constitutes suffi-
cient action by the state to invoke the prohibitions of the four-
teenth amendment. The ninth circuit, the only court of appeals
to have squarely confronted the question at this time, has ruled
that enactment is not sufficient state action. 5 Prior to this deci-
sion, the federal district courts had split almost evenly on the
issue,6 while the state courts had been unanimous in holding that
there was no state action.6"
The cases finding sufficient state involvement tend to rely
heavily on Reitman v. Mulkey." That decision held unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause a section of the Califor-
nia Constitution prohibiting restrictions on an individual's right
to refuse to sell property to anyone for any reason. The purpose
and effect of that section was to invalidate certain existing anti-
discriminatory housing acts and to preclude any such future en-
actments. The Supreme Court phrased the question in terms of
whether the section ."would encourage and significantly involve
the State in private racial discrimination."69 Following this ra-
tionale, some courts have held that by enacting section 9-503 of
the UCC, the state is in effect establishing a state policy favoring
self-help repossessions, thus encouraging and becoming signifi-,
cantly involved in such repossessions.
The courts reaching the opposite conclusion tend to distin-
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed
by action.
65. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 42 U.S.L.W. 2231 (9th Cir., Oct. 4,
1973).
66. State action: Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 2116 (D.
Mas,., Aug. 15, 1973); James v. Pinnix, No. 72J-250(N) (S.D. Miss., Feb. 14, 1973);
Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., No. 6729 (D. Ver., Nov. 1, 1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
No state action: Colvin v. Avco Fin. Servs., No. 35-72 (N.D. Utah, Jan. 4, 1973);
Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351
F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D.
Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
67. Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, No. 43,401 (Fla., July 31, 1973); Messenger
v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972); Brown v. United States
Nat'l Bank, No. 10,100 (Ore., Apr. 19, 1973); Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, No. 73-714
(R.I. Super. Ct., Apr. 4, 1973).
It should be noted that some of the decisions finding no state action were framed in
jurisdictional terms; that is, they decided that the actions were not "under color of state
law" as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). While the two concepts are not necessarily
identical, it would seem that in this context an action found not even to be "under color
of state law" could hardly be "state action."
68. :387 U.S. 369 (1967).
69. Id. at :376.
15
Orr and Tedards: Bank Credit Cards and the Right of Setoff
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
guish Reitman on two grounds. 0 First, Reitman dealt with the
sensitive area of racial discrimination, in which the courts are
alert to discover subtle state action tending indirectly to encour-
age discrimination or to circumvent individual rights. Second,
there was a greater degree of state involvement in Reitman be-
cause the constitutional provision authorized previously prohib-
ited discrimination rather than merely codifying an existing
right.
Regardless of the eventual resolution of this question, bank-
ing setoff stands on a significantly sounder constitutional footing
than does self-help repossession under the UCC since setoff is
generally not a codified remedy but rather a common law right
based on the mutual debtor-creditor relationship between the
parties.7 Some states have statutes concerning banker's liens,
2
but these refer to liens on securities or commercial paper depos-
ited with the bank, whereas setoff against a customer's account
is entirely different. 73 The UCC, while recognizing the possible
existence of the setoff practice,74 does not attempt to define, au-
thorize, or legitimize it in any way. And although a statutory
provision incorporating the English common law75 is some state
endorsement of a right such as setoff, it is clearly not state in-
volvement or encouragement of the substantial nature contem-
70. E.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 42 U.S.L.W. 2231 (9th Cir. Oct.
4, 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 731-32 (D. Colo. 1972).
71. See cases cited note 18 supra. See generally 5A MICHIE § 114. For exceptions
where setoff has been codified, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-67 (1959) and LA. CiV. CODE
art. 2210 (1952). Both of these statutes, however, place so many restrictions on setoff that
due process requirements pose no problems.
72. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3054 (West 1954).
73. Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105
P.2d 118, 121 (1940).
74. Section 4-201(1) refers to "rights of a collecting bank such as those resulting from
outstanding advances on the item and valid rights of setoff;" by using the adjective
"valid" the section avoids expanding existing setoff doctrine. Section 4-303(1) mentions
setoff' in order to specify when it is too late for banks to exercise such a right if it does
exist; the section recognizes the state's jurisprudence by the qualifying phrase "whether
or not effective under other rules of law." Section 9-104(i) expressly excludes "any right
of setoltf" from the coverage of article 9 on secured transactions.
75. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (West 1954).
The Uniform Commercial Code contains a somewhat similar provision in section 1-
103: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
[Vol. 26
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plated by Reitman.71 It would appear that banking setoff is not
subject to due process requirements under the theory that state
enactment is sufficient state action.
However, the federal courts have formulated another stan-
dard for cases in which there is no specific state action among the
acts complained of, but the state is nevertheless so involved that
the fourteenth amendment should control the conduct under
consideration. This "public function" doctrine was first intro-
duced by the Supreme Court in 1946 in Marsh v. Alabama,
77
involving a private company town that refused to allow distribu-
tion of religious literature. It has since been applied by the Court
to cases involving a private park whose management was closely
entwined with municipal control,7 a private restaurant leasing
city property and discriminating on a racial basis,79 a shopping
center preventing peaceful picketing," and a political party pro-
hibiting Negroes from voting in an "advisory" primary prior to a
state-controlled Democratic primary." The limits of this doctrine
are not precisely defined; one of the more precise statements of
its meaning was given in Evans v. Newton,12 the private park
case:
Conduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined
with governmental policies or so impregnated with a govern-
mental character as to become subject to the constitutional lim-
itations placed upon state action . . . That is to say, when
private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agen-
cies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitu-
tional limitations.
Several lower federal courts have recently considered a fact
situation that arguably falls within the "public function" doc-
76. "This is not the final answer to the touchstone of state action. Were such a test
the only one, the California statutes adopting the common law of England would cast the
shadow of state action over all activity and pose an argument that could blanket all
individual wrongs under 142 U.S.C. §1 1983." Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank,
42 U.S.L.W. 2231 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
77. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
78. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
79. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
80. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
:108 (1968). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
81. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (opinion of Mr. Justice Clark).
82. :382 U.S. 296 (1966).
83. Id. at 299.
19741
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trine, although most of them did not discuss the doctrine explic-
itly." This situation involves the question of whether a public
utility company is acting under color of state law when it discon-
tinues service to a customer for alleged failure to pay his bills.
Most of the courts considering this issue have found the necessary
degree of state involvement. 5 There are strong similarities to the
banking setoff fact situation here. In both situations a private
corporation is able to deprive the customer of his "property"
without the intervention of the state or any other third party and
without even having to come in contact with the customer or any
other property belonging to him. 6 The public utility cases em-
phasize the pervasive nature of the state regulation, which is
certainly present in the banking industry as well.
87
On the other hand there are also important differences be-
tween the two situations. Many of the public utility cases are
clearly distinguishable because of the existence of state statutes
authorizing the discontinuance of service, 8 or because of other
factual matters. 9 Of greater significance, however, is that all the
84. One which does discuss it is Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566,
569 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
85. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409
U.S. 815 (1972): Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co.,
:,16 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D.
Ohio 1972). Contra, Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
86. Some of the public utility cases discuss the trespass by the utility's employees
on the customer's land when disconnecting his service. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison
Co., :350 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp.
241, 245-46 (N.D. Ohio 1972). Only one case treats it as a crucial factor. Hattell v. Public
Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1972). The others do not even mention whether
such a trespass has occurred.
87. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-101 to -317 (1962); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 4.
88. See Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1972). In Lucas v. Wiscon-
sin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973), there
was no statute but there was a regulation of the state Public Service Commission contain-
ing such authorization. Id. at 641-42. In the face of this regulation, the court nonetheless
held there was insufficient state involvement to ,constitute state action.
The issue in these cases more closely resembles the question of whether legislative
enactment of section 9-503 of the UCC constitutes state action.
89. In one case the fact that the utility's employees had entered private property to
cut off the service seemed to be a critical factor. Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp.
24(0, 245 (D. Colo. 1972); see note 86 supra. In another case, there was an unusually close
relationship between the utility and a municipality-the city received 5% of the utility's
gross earnings, and it also exercised a statutory authority to review the utility's regulations
with the right of approval, rejection, or revision. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459
F.2d 566, 568-70 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
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cases emphasize that the public utility has been granted a mo-
nopoly in its geographic area as a result of clear state action,
90
while banks enjoy no such monopoly.' Thus the public utility
question, which itself has not been conclusively resolved,92 pres-
ents an interesting analogy to the banking setoff question but
hardly appears to dictate the solution.
One author has suggested that because of the nature of the
banking business and the degree of state control and regulation,
the "public function" doctrine may be applicable.13 If this were
true, the key factor would seemingly have to be the state regula-
tion, because banking surely is not an inherently public operation
in the same sense as the operation of parks and company towns.
The idea that regulation alone can involve the state in otherwise
private activity to the extent contemplated by the fourteenth
amendment has been limited, however, by the recent case of
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis:9'
The District Court was at pains to point out in its opinion
what is considered to be the "pervasive" nature of the regulation
of private clubs by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
However detailed this type of regulation may be in some
particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage
90. "IT[he state has in effect granted monopoly protection to Wisconsin Elec-
tric .... Customers, like plaintiff, are therefore denied the practical and often effective
remedy of taking their patronage elsewhere when treated unfairly by a supplier." Lucas
v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1114 (1973). See also Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972) ("could not buy these commodities from any other
source"); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Kan. 1972) ("enjoy a
complete monopoly of supplying an essential commodity to the citizens").
91. The result of the public utility monopoly is that the individual customer cannot
obtain his utility service from any other source. In effect, granting this monopoly precludes
the customer from taking his business elsewhere and arguably involves the state with the
pract ices of the monopolistic utility to a sufficient degree to constitute state action. In the
banking field, however, though the state certainly limits the customer's alternatives by
restricting entry into the field (see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-57 (1962)), there is no state-
created monopoly. A customer may be somewhat inconvenienced, but he can always
change banks if he is dissatisfied with the service he receives. The practice of banking
setoff does not combine with the state licensing action to deny banking services to the
customer altogether, as in the public utility cases.
92. While only one federal court has found that no state action exists, it was a circuit
court sitting en banc, and there were only two dissents. Certiorari has been denied by the
Supreme Court. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
93. Hastings Note, supra note 51, at 1604.
94. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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racial discrimination. Nor can it be said to make the State in
any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's
enterprise."
Can the state's regulation of banking institutions be said to "fos-
ter or encourage" banking setoff? It would seem not; banking
setoff is merely a commercial tool being employed by a private
body, unaffected one way or the other by state regulation of other
aspects of its business. To label this state action would be a
misnomer. It is in reality state inaction in an area where the state
could act but has chosen not to do so. To bring this situation
under the language of the fourteenth amendment would certainly
be an unprecedented step.
It thus appears that summary banking setoff, in spite of its
practical similarities to such constitutionally prohibited practices
as prejudgment garnishment of bank accounts without a hearing,
is not itself a violation of the due process clause. If the practice
is to be prohibited, it will have to be done by the legislative
branch of the government.
IV. LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS
A. Truth in Lending Act
There is no existing federal legislation that can be inter-
preted to prohibit the practice of banking setoff of credit card
debts. The 1968 Consumer Credit Protection Act,9" however, im-
poses various controls on the credit card industry. Of particular
interest is subchapter I of that legislation, the Truth in Lending
Act, 7 which is designed "to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit."98 Specific provisions of the Act must
be examined to determine whether banking setoff is one of the
"credit terms" that must be revealed to potential cardholders in
a "meaningful" manner.9
Because a bank credit card system clearly falls within the
95. Id. at 176-77.
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970), as amended.
97. Id, §§ 1601-65 (1970).
98. Id. § 1601 (1970).
99. Some banks already make a limited disclosure of the existence of a right of setoff
while others do not. See note 32 supra.
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Act's definition of an "open end credit plan," ' a bank must
apprise its customers of the circumstances leading to the imposi-
tion of a finance charge, the methods of computing the balance
and the charge applicable to it, and any fixed or minimum
charges.'"' In addition there must be disclosure of "[t]he condi-
tions under which the creditor may retain or acquire any security
interest in any property to secure the payments of any credit
extended under the plan, and a description of the interest or
interests which may be so retained or acquired."'0 2 The question
thus narrows to whether a bank's right of setoff against a deposit
account is a "security interest in any property to secure the pay-
ments of any credit extended . .. ."
Although the Act itself does not define "security interest,"
it does delegate to the Federal Reserve Board the power and duty
to prescribe rules necessary to prevent evasion of the Act and to
effect its purposes.103 Under this authority the Board has
promulgated regulation Z,'14 which defines "security interest" as
follows:
"Security interest" and "security" mean any interest in prop-
erty which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
The terms include, but are not limited to, security interests
under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mortgages,
deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether
or not recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other
similar liens, vendors's liens in both real and personal property,
the interest of a seller in a contract for the sale of real property,
any lien on property arising by operation of law, and any interest
in a lease when used to secure payment or performance of an
obligation. 10
Even under this comprehensive definition, however, the right of
setoff does not appear to qualify as a security interest.
Regulation Z lists several specific liens which are to be con-
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1970) reads as follows:
The term"open end credit plan" refers to a plan prescribing the terms of credit
transactions which may be made thereunder from time to time and under the
terms of which a finance charge may be computed on the outstanding unpaid
balance from time to time thereunder.
101. Id. § 1637 (1970).
102. Id. § 1637(a)(7) (1970).
103. Id. § 1604 (1970).
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sidered security interests, and it also includes the more general
categories of "other consensual or confessed liens" and "any lien
on property arising by operation of law." The question of whether
the right of setoff could be considered a lien within this definition
is unnecessarily complicated by the fact that some courts have
referred to setoff as a banker's lien.' As mentioned earlier,"7
however, such statements are inaccurate. The concept of banker's
lien properly applies to those cases in which the bank has posses-
sion of securities or commercial paper belonging to the customer,
under the theory that the bank relies upon its possession of these
specific items as security for its advances or extensions of time
to the customer.' 8 When the issue has been presented, banking
setoff has been clearly distinguished from the banker's lien."9 The
most obvious ground for this distinction is that the bank becomes
the owner of funds on deposit and cannot have a lien on its own
property."0 More generally, setoff is a one-step process of cancel-
106. E.g., Batson v. Alexander City Bank, 179 Ala. 490, 497, 60 So. 313, 315 (1912);
McStay Supply Co. v. John S. Cook & Co., 35 Nev. 284, 297, 132 P. 545, 548 (1913).
107. Set, note 73 and accompanying text supra.
108. Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U.S. 354, 391-92 (1889) (dicta); Goggin v. Bank of Amer-
ica Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 183 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
109. Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 105 P.2d
118 (19,40). The same distinction is made in 5A MICHIE § 114: "[Wihile it is sometimes
said that a bank has a lien on the deposits for this purpose, the more accurate statement
is that this right of the bank is not a lien or in the nature of a lien, but a right of set-off,
or of an application of payments." A concise and well-documented discussion of the
distinction also appears in Note, Right of Bank to Set Off Deposit against a Depositor's
Debt Despite Undisclosed Equity, 38 HARV. L. REV. 800 (1925).
It could be argued to the contrary that, since setoff has so often been referred to as a
lien, it should be considered the equivalent of a lien for the remedial purposes of the Truth
in lending Act. The Harvard Law Review Note lends some support to this position: "The
bank's right of set-off has transcended procedural significance, however, and despite the
distinct ions alluded to, courts and the commercial world treat it as substantially equiva-
lent to a banker's lien." Id. at 800-01. This is apparently the position implicitly adopted
in Hastings Note, supra note 51, at 1596-97. The author quotes authority to the effect that
banking setoff is in the nature of a lien or security interest, from which he concludes that
it is within the regulation Z definition. The argument is not persuasive, however. The
authorities referring to setoff as a lien have done so in contexts where the label was com-
pletely unimportant (see cases cited note 106 supra), while the writers and other author-
it ies have been careful to maintain the doctrinal distinction. To base a decision upon dicta
and careless language rather than upon holdings and documented logical distinctions
would hardly be good judicial practice. This is not to say that such a result would be
contrary to the purposes of the Truth in Lending Act, but rather that the definition of
setoll' and the language of the Act would have to be stretched too much to reach this result.
The preferable solution would be a legislative revision of the Act. See also note 118 infra.
1lt). Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105
P.2d 118. 121 (1940); Note, supra note 109.
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ling one contract debt against another;"' there is no prior charge
upon particular property for the payment of a particular debt,"
and no prior limitation on the customer's use of the deposited
funds,"3 as would be present in the case of a lien. Similarities
notwithstanding, banking setoff is simply not a lien.
Nor is setoff a security interest under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. The basic UCC definition of security interest is very
similar to that of regulation Z: "an interest in personal property
or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion.""' 4 But article 9, which deals specifically with secured trans-
actions, excludes from its coverage "any right of set-off.""115 The
official comment explaining this exception is worth noting: "The
remaining exclusions go to other types of claims which do not
customarily serve as commercial collateral: judgments under par-
agraph (h), set-offs under paragraph (i) and tort claims under
paragraph (k)."1" Although this comment does not state categori-
cally that setoff is not a security interest, it is a compelling indi-
cation that the Code draftsmen considered setoff to be an entirely
different kind of claim.
The regulation Z definition, however, is purposefully broad
and is not limited to enumerated examples such as liens and UCC
security interests. Thus, the basic test is whether setoff is "any
interest in property which secures payment or performance of an
obligation." The concept of securing payment has traditionally
meant guaranteeing payment, making an adequate pledge of pay-
ment, or in some other way making payment certain." 7 A cus-
tomer's deposit account does not serve this purpose, for it is nei-
ther the theoretical nor the functional equivalent of collateral. No
provision in the standard bank credit card agreements requires a
customer to open an account with the issuing bank or even to
maintain a specified balance in a preexisting account. Whether
111. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
112. A lien is "a charge upon a particular piece of property, including realty, for the
payment or discharge of a particular debt or duty in priority to the general debts or duty
of the owner." Camden County Welfare Bd. v. Federal Dep. Ins. Corp., 1 N.J. Super. 532,
546, 62 A.2d 416, 422 (1948).
113. "The purpose of a lien is to limit the use of the property upon which a lien is
placed, so as to provide security for the payment of a claim." Kerr v. Bowers, 48 F.2d 227,
232 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
114. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37).
115. Id. § 9-104(i).
116. Id. § 9-104, Comment 8.
117. See United States v. Jacobs, 304 F. Supp. 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
1974]
23
Orr and Tedards: Bank Credit Cards and the Right of Setoff
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a cardholder will have funds on deposit when his credit card debt
matures is entirely beyond the bank's control; such a fortuitous
circumstance hardly coincides with accepted notions. of securing
payment. It thus appears that banking setoff is not a security
interest within the regulation Z definition and consequently is not
covered by the present disclosure requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act. 8
B. Uniform Consumer Credit Code
The only other general legislation potentially applicable to
setoff is the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), which has
been adopted by only a few states."' Even where adopted, the
UCCC does no more to curtail banking setoff of credit card debts
than does the Truth in Lending Act.
The UCCC differentiates between two classes of credit card
arrangements-the seller credit card and the lender credit card.
A seller credit card is one that permits cardholders to purchase
only from the issuer or related concerns;2 0 obvious examples are
department store charge cards and gasoline credit cards.'2' The
lender credit card is essentially a loan agreement in which the
issuer contracts to pay the cardholder's debts to specified third
parties. 2 1 Within this class are the three-party credit card sys-
tems of banks and other independent companies such as Ameri-
can Express.' A lender credit card is also defined in both com-
mon parlance and the UCCC as a revolving loan account.
4
In spite of this detailed terminology, the disclosure provi-
118. This conclusion is indirectly supported by hearings held before a Senate commit-
te( investigating a bill that would have prohibited a bank from setting off a customer's
credit card debt against his deposit account. Hearings on S. 652, supra note 10. Several
wit nesses made the point that setoff is particularly unfair and unreasonable because the
consmner is always unaware of the bank's power until it is exercised against him. Id. at
236i (statement of Prof. William F. Willier, Director, Nat'l Consumer Law Center); id. at
272 (statement of Susan First, General Counsel, N.Y.C. Dep't of Consumer Affairs); id.
at 288 (statement of Betty Furness). Yet at no time during the hearings did anyone suggest
that hanks are already required to make a "meaningful disclosure" of the setoff right
unler the Truth in Lending Act.
119. As of January, 1974, the UCCC is in effect in only seven states: Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. 1 CCH 1973 CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
r 4770 (1974).
1201. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(16) [hereinafter cited as UCCC].
121. Id. § 1.301(16), Comment.
122. Id. § 1.301(9).
12:1. Id. § 1.301(9), Comment.
124. Id. § 3.108, Comment.
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sions for both classes of credit cards are nearly identical and are
very similar to those in the Truth in Lending Act.' To comply
with section 3.309(1)(g) of the UCCC, the issuer of a lender credit
card must disclose "conditions under which the lender may retain
or acquire a security interest in property to secure the balances
resulting from loans made pursuant to the revolving loan account,
and a description of the interest or interests which may be re-
tained or acquired.' 2 The UCCC contains no other definition of
security interest. Thus, section 3.309(1)(g) is certainly no more
inclusive than its counterpart in the Truth in Lending Act, which,
even with the administrative gloss of regulation Z, apparently
does not require banks to disclose their power of setoff.
C. Proposed Legislative Controls
Legislation has been introduced in the United States Senate
that would eliminate most of the controversy surrounding bank-
ing setoff of credit card indebtedness. The pending bill' 2 contains
amendments of several kinds to the Truth in Lending Act. Title
1, entitled "Fair Credit Billing," would resulate credit cards and
revolving charge accounts. Setoff is explicitly covered by section
169, which reads:
Prohibition of offsets
(a) A card issuer may not take any action to offset a card-
holder's indebtedness arising- in connection with a consumer
credit transaction under the relevant credit card plan against
funds of the rardholder held on deposit with the card issuer
unless-
(1) such action was previously authorized in writing by
the cardholder in accordance with a credit plan whereby
the cardholder agrees periodinally to pay debts incurred in
his open end credit account by permitting the card issuer
periodically to deduct all or a portion of such debt from the
cardholder's deposit account, and
(2) such action with respect to any outstanding disputed
amount not be taken by the card issuer upon request of the
cardholder.
125. Compare UCCC § 2.310 (seller credit card) with id. § 3.309 (lender credit card)
and 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1970) (Truth in Lending Act).
126. UCCC § 3.309(1)(g).
127, S. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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(b) This section does not alter or affect the right under State
law of a card issuer to attach or otherwise levy upon funds of a
cardholder held on deposit with the card issuer if that remedy
is constitutonally available to creditors generally.
Disclosure obviously pales beside this bill's objectives, for
section 169 is intended to eliminate the favored position now
occupied by banks as compared with cardholders' other credi-
tors.'28 A bank would have to use judicial process to attach a
cardholder's deposit account before it could debit the account to
satisfy his credit card debt. Under Fuentes and its progeny, at-
tachment would undoubtedly invoke due process notice and hear-
ing requirements.' 0
Nevertheless, the flexibility and convenience of existing
bank credit card plans would be preserved. Pursuant to section
169, a cardholder desiring to avoid making monthly payments
could give his bank written authorization to charge his credit card
debt against his deposit account on a regular basis. Even in this
situation the cardholder is protected because he retains the right
to revoke his authorization with respect to disputed amounts.'30
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that banks would be allowed to
include an authorization clause as a mandatory provision in all
cardholder agreements. The remedial nature of the Truth in
Lending Act would be inconsistent with judicial enforcement of
purported authorization clauses executed as part of an adhesion
agreement or obtained in a manner not calculated to invoke
knowing consent by the consumer.
As this note is written, the bill amending the Truth in
Lending Act is being considered by the House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee after passing the Senate on July 23, 1973, by a
128. As written, this section is broad enough that it could be interpreted to override
the provision of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970), which allows the setoff of
muLual debts between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor. The Bankruptcy Act at
present clearly allows a bank to set off a bankrupt's deposit account against any debts
owed by him to the bank, absent fraud or collusion. Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d
:114. 324 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967). There would seem to be no reason
for the Truth in Lending Act to change a rule affecting only the priorities of creditors, and
such a result is probably not intended by the proposal. The caveat of subsection (b) could
easily be expanded to make it clear that the Bankruptcy Act provision is not to be
affected.
129. See notes 49-59 and accompanying text supra.
1:10. The details of this right of revocation and how the consumer is to be informed
of it would be left to implementing regulations of the Federal Reserve Board. S. REP. No.
93.278. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
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vote of 9O-0.'' A similar bill,32 however, was passed by the Senate
during the Ninety-Second Congress only to die in the House
Banking and Currency Committee.' 33 Senator Proxmire, the prin-
cipal sponsor of both bills, has evinced the fear that the same
result may await the current proposal.31 Thus the prospects for
an immediate legislative resolution of the problem remain uncer-
tain.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears from the preceding discussion that summary
banking setoff of a customer's bank credit card debt against his
deposit account is virtually unregulated by present law: The
practice comports with all the traditional common law prerequis-
ites for setoff; it is not violative of due process for it entails no
state action; and it is not controlled by existing consumer legisla-
tion because of its unique status as an equitable remedy growing
out of the debtor-creditor relationship. A court, of course, could
conceivably reach a contrary result because these questions as-
suredly turn on fine distinctions. In the interest of logically con-
sistent legal theory, however, it would be better to encourage
legislative resolution of the issue than to stretch and distort exist-
ing judicial doctrines.
In weighing the alternative responses that a legislature could
adopt, the determinative question should be what abuses and
inequities exist and how they could best be eliminated. It is possi-
ble to formulate fact situations in which bank credit card setoff
would lead to totally unjust results. Assume, for example, that a
bank's billing department has charged a customer twice for a
credit card purchase, that the customer has been unable to pene-
trate the bank's bureaucracy to have his account corrected, and
that the automatic warnings of the computerized billing system
have run their course. '3 If the bank exercises its setoff power and
collects the stated amount due, the customer may decide that it
is not worth the trouble to pursue the matter further, especially
131. 119 CONC. REC. 14,428 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
132. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
13:3. See S. REP. No. 93-278, supra note 130, at 29 (additional views of Messrs. Prox-
mire and Hathaway).
134. Id.
135. Experiences of this type are reported by numerous witnesses in Hearings on S.
652, supra note 10.
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if the amount n dispute is relatively small. Or, if the customer
is uneducated and inexperienced in such matters, he may simply
be so overwhelmed by this type of summary action that he has
no idea how to seek appropriate relief."' In either event, the bank
has profited by its own mistake and the customer has been un-
fairly deprived of his funds by the bank's exercise of its setoff
power.
The proposed Proxmire amendment to the Truth in Lending
Act"' would eliminate abuses of this type by denying the setoff
power to banks in their credit card operations. The efficacy of this
solution is hardly open to question, but the necessity for it is not
so clear. The necessity could be shown by documentation of a
significant number of cases, such as the one described above, in
which consumers are being treated inequitably. 38 In the absence
of such documentation, 9 however, it would seem only fair to
assume that the banks are using setoff more judiciously. The
question thus becomes whether bank credit card setoff should be
prohibited even though it has only been used to collect delinquent
debts froth cardholders who can make no claim of inequity.
Although it is possible to argue that setoff should be prohibited
even in this situation, there seems to be no reason to abolish a
practice which has not been proved unfair. In the absence of
1:36. The Supreme Court in Fuentes recognized the existence of this problem. The
('ourt exhibited concern about the efficacy of protective provisions requiring a party
seeking the writ of replevin to post bond and expose himself to possible liability for
(lamages. Concluding that these limitations would at most test the strength of the appli-
cants own belief in his rights, the Court stated:
They may not even test that much. For if an applicant for the writ knows that
he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with little access to
Igal hell) and little familiarity with legal procedures, there may be a substantial
possibility that a summary seizure of property-however unwarranted-may go
unchallenged and the applicant may feel that he can act with impunity.
4l07 U.S. at 8:3 n.13.
The likelihood of this consumer reaction seems even greater in banking setoff than
in replevin. First, setoff is a self-help remedy which does not even require that a bond be
post ed. Second, the consumer is even less likely to recognize a bookkeeping manipulation
a.s an infringement subject to legal redress than he is to recognize a physical seizure of
his tangible lroperty under replevin.
1:17. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
18. Discovery of those cases in which the consumer silently accepted his fate would
he unlikely, but at least some of the victims could be expected to be both loud and
industrious in exposing their experiences.
1:19. The authors in their research did not find a single documented example of this
type of abuse, or even an unsupported allegation that such abuses occur. In particular,
no such allegations were made in the Senate hearings on the 1971 Proxmire legislation.
Hearings on S. 652, supra note 10.
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further evidence, the Proximire proposal on this particular point
may be an overreaction.
The legislative response that does seem appropriate is to
make meaningful disclosure of the setoff power mandatory under
the Truth in Lending Act. An undisclosed right of this sort in a
consumer credit agreement is directly contrary to the stated pur-
pose of the Act.'4" Knowledge of the existence of the setoff power
might significantly influence a customer's decision to enter a
credit card agreement with the bank handling his deposit ac-
counts, or vice versa. Why should a bank benefit from the hap-
penstance that one of its cardholders is also a depositor,'4 ' when
the customer has never been made aware of the consequences of
his dual role? The failure of the Truth in Lending Act to preclude
such uninformed decision-making by the consumer was probably
no more than an oversight. A mandatory requirement of meaning-
ful disclosure would be consistent both with existing provisions
of the Truth in Lending Act and with the demonstrated nature
of the setoff practice.
LAWRENCE B. ORR
JACK H. TEDARDS, JR.
140. The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is "to assure a meaningful disclosure
of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601
(1970).
141. It is actually more than happenstance because, during the period of mass unsoli-
cited mailings of bank credit cards, lists of bank depositors were a prime source of names.
Weistart, supra note 3, at 1480 n.13; Hearings on S. 652, supra note 10, at 236 (statement
of Prof. William F. Willier).
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